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STATEMENT OF TKE CASE
(1)

Nature of the Case:
Kootenai County, (hereinafter "Employer") appeals the Industrial Commission's

(hereinafter "Commission") Decision and Order concluding that Mark W. Mussman, (hereinafter
"Claimant"), was eligible for unemployment benefits because Employer believes the
Commission inappropriately reweighed the evidence in the record and made findings of fact not
supported by the evidence.
(2)

Course of the Proceedings Below:
Claimant filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits after his employment with

Employer ended.

On January 12, 2009, the Idaho Department of Labor (hereinafter

"Department") issued an Eligibility Determination (hereinafter "Determination") finding
Claimant eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Exhibit 3. In the Determination, the
Department found Employer discharged Claimant, but not for misconduct in connection with
employment pursuant to Idaho Code $72-1366(5). Exhibit 3. Employer filed a timely appeal of
the Determination with the Department's Appeals Bureau. Exhibit 4.
On March 10, 2009, an appeals examiner held a hearing in the matter. Tr. p. 4, L. 1.
Claimant testified at the hearing and Mr. Joseph Clark testified for Employer. In a Decision
mailed to the parties on March 24, 2009, the appeals examiner reversed the Determination. R.
pp. 1-6. Claimant filed a timely appeal of the appeals examiner's decision with the Commission.

R. pp. 7-9.

H R E F OF RESPONDEN?'
DI'PARTMI3YT OF LABOR

Claimant submitted a document entitled "Claimant's Brief" to the Commission. R. pp.
17-34. Claimant appended additional documents to his Brief that were not part of the record
before the appeals examiner. R. p. 35. In an Order dated May 6,2009, the Commission treated
the submission of those additional documents as a request for a new hearing. R. pp. 35-38. The
Comlnission denied that request, but allowed the parties to submit briefs. R. pp. 35-38.
The Commission conducted a de novo review of the record before the appeals examiner
consisting of the audio recording of the hearing and all of the exhibits entered at that hearing
before the appeals examiner. On June 4, 2009, the Commission filed a Decision and Order
reversing the appeals examiner's decision.

Appendix A. In its Decision and Order, the

Commission made it clear to the parties that it did not consider the documents appended to
Claimant's Brief in making its decision. Appendix A, p. 16. On July 13, 2009, Employer filed a
Notice of Appeal to this Court. R. pp. 57-65.
(3)

Statement of Facts:
Claimant began working for Employer on August 27,2001. Tr. p. 5, L1. 16-18; p. 17, L1.

1-3. When his employment ended, Claimant was working as a planner. Tr. p. 5, L1. 19-23; p.
10, L1. 15-22; p. 17, L1. 7-8. In 2006, Claimant signed an affidavit without prior approval from
his supervisor. Tr. p. 20, L1. 13-25; p. 22, L1. 3-18. Claimant received a corrective action in
March of 2007 from his former supervisor, Employer's interim building and planning director,
Cheri Howell. Tr. p. 7, L1. 1-12; p. 17, L1. 20-25.

In June 2008, Claimant signed another affidavit without prior approval from his
supervisor. Tr. p. 20, Lt. 13-25; p. 22, Ll. 19-25; p. 23, L1. 1-3. Employer does not have a
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written policy, nor did Employer say anything to Claimant about signing affidavits. Tr. p. 20, L1.
11-12. Before October 14, 2008, Employer never disciplined Claimant for signing affidavits
without prior approval. Tr. p. 20, L1. 13-25; p. 22, L1. 10-25; p. 23, L1. 1-3.
While Claimant was still under Ms. Howell's supervision, the building and planning
department worked on a development project called the "Graham Project." The Graham Project
required Ms. Howell to resolve questions about the interpretation of certain county building code
provisions. Tr. p. 19, L1. 3-9; p. 24, L. 12. The building and planning department was still
working on the Graham Project when Employer hired Mr. Clark to be the building and planning
director. He then became Claimant's immediate supervisor. Tr. p. 5, L1. 14-15; p. 5, L1. 12-13;
p. 5, L1. 24-25; p. 6, Ll. 1-3; p. 19, Ll. 10-16.
On August 8, 2008, Mr. Clark sent Claimant a written "administrative interpretation" of
county building code provisions regarding setback issues for the Graham Project that differed
from earlier interpretations. Tr. p. 24, L1. 11-25. Claimant, Mr. Clark and others discussed Mr.
Clark's interpretation at length on August 11, 2008, and Claimant agreed to the written
interpretation, but opposed its application to the Graham Project. Tr. p. 25, L1.6-9.
On August 28, 2008, at the request of a representative of the Graham Project's property
owner, Claimant signed an affidavit containing a statement on the historical interpretation of
county building code provisions dealing with structure setbacks for the Graham Project and other
projects that had been established prior to Claimant's employment. Tr. p. 18, L1. 1-16; p. 20, L1.
4-8; p. 29, Ll. 13-19. Claimant did not seek Mr. Clark's approval prior to signing the affidavit.
Tr. p. 18, L1. 6-8. Mr. Clark reviewed the affidavit shortly after Claimant signed it, but did not
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say anything to Claimant about it until October 14, 2008. Tr. p. 10, L1. 5-12. On October 14,
2008, Mr. Clarlc gave Claimant a memorandum of pending disciplinary action and at the same
time, Mr. Clark discharged Claimant. Tr. p. 6, Ll. 6-14; p. 13, Ll. 4-15; p. 23, L1. 18-25; p. 24,
L1. 1-5.
ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL
Is there substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial
Commission's factual findings and conclusion that Claimant was eligible for unemployment
benefits because Employer did not discharge Claimant for misconduct in connection with
employment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

In appeals from decisions of the Commission, this Court's review is limited to questions
of law. Idaho Constitution Article V,

5 9; Pimley v. Best Values. Inc., 132 Idaho 432, 434, 974

P.2d 78, 80 (1999). When this Court reviews a Commission decision, "it exercises free review
over questions of law, but reviews questions of fact only to determine whether substantial and
competent evidence supports the Commission's findings." Oxlev v. Medicine Rock, 139 Idaho
476,479, 80 P.3d 1077, 1080 (2003). Whether an employee's conduct constitutes misconduct is

a factual determination that will be upheld unless not supported by substantial and competent
evidence. Harris v. Electrical Wholesale, 141 Idaho 1, 3, 105 P.3d 267, 269 (2004). Where
conflicting evidence is presented that is suppoited by substantial, competent evidence, the
findings reached by the Commission will be sustained regardless of whether the Court may have
reached a different conclusion.
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m,141 Idaho at 3, 105 P.3d at 269.

Substantial and

competent evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion. Oxley, 139 Idaho at 479, 80 P.3d at 1080. The Court has described the appropriate
test for substantial and competent evidence for the purposes of judicial review as requiring a
conrt to determine whether an agency's findings of fact are reasonable. Steen v. Denny's
Restaurant, 135 Idaho 234,237,16 P.3d 910,913 (2000).
It is for the Commission to determine the credit and weight to be given to the testimony
admitted. Bullard v. Sun Valley Aviation. Inc., 128 Idaho 430, 432, 914 P.2d 564, 566 (1996).

The Commission's conclusions regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will not be
disturbed unless the conclusions are clearly erroneous. In reviewing a decision of the
Commission, the Conrt views all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party who
prevailed before the Commission.

m,139 Idaho at 479,80 P.3d at 1080.
ARGUMENT

There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the Industrial
Comnission's factual findings and conclusion that Claimant was eligible for
unemplovment benefits because Emplover did not discharge Claimant for
misconduct in connection with emplovment.
Employer misunderstands the nature of the Commission's review of the record. Idaho
Code $ 72-1368(7) gives the Commission authority to affirm reverse, modify, set aside or revise
the decision of the appeals examiner. It provides in pertinent part:
(7) The commission shall decide all claims for review filed by any interested
vartv in accordance with its own rnles of procedure not in conflict herewith. The
record before the commission shall consist of the record of proceedings before the
appeals examiner, unless it appears to the commission that the interests of justice
A

.
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require that the interested parties be permitted to present additional evidence. In
that event, the commission may, in its sole discretion, conduct a hearing or may
remand the matter back to the appeals examiner for an additional hearing and
decision. On the basis of the record of proceedings before the appeals examiner as
well as additional evidence, if'allowed, the commission shall affirm. reverse,
modify, set aside or revise the decision of 'the appeals examiner or may refer the
matter back to the appeals examiner for further proceedings.
Idaho Code S 72-1368(7) (Emphasis added.)
This Court has consistently held that Idaho Code $72-1368(7) provides for a de novo
review by the Commission based on the record before the appeals examiner. Scrivner v. Service
Ida Corporation, 126 Idaho 954,958, 895 P.2d 555, 559 (1995); DesFosses v. State Department
of Emplovment, 123 Idaho 746,748, 852 P.2d 498,500 (1993); In re Guaiardo, 119 Idaho 639,
809 P.2d 500 (1991); Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corporation, 117 Idaho 277, 787 P.2d 263

This Court has explained that de novo, in the context of a standard of review, means
generally "a new hearing or a hearing for the second time, contemplating an entire trial in the
same manner in which the matter was heard and a review of [the] previous hearing" in which
"the court hears the matter as a court of original and not appellate jurisdiction." "The term 'de
novo' generally means a new hearing or a hearing for the second time, contemplating an entire

trial in the same manner in which the matter was heard and a review of previous hearing. On
such a hearing the court hears the matter as a court of original and not appellate jurisdiction."
Monroe v. Chuck & Del's, Inc., 123 Idaho 627, 629 n.2, 851 P.2d 341, 343 n.2 (1993), citing
Beker Indus. Inc. v. Georgetown Irr. Dist., 101 Idaho 187, 190, 610 P.2d 546, 549 (1980). See,
also Scrivner, 126 Idaho at, 958, 895 P.2d at 559.

Employer brings this appeal because it believes the Commission inappropriately
reweighed the evidence in the record and made findings of fact that were not supported by the
evidence.

Employer contends that the Commission should give deference to the appeals

examiner's findings of fact. Suggesting that the Commission cannot function as a fact finder,
Employer argues that the appeals examiner functions as the fact finder and decision maker and
that the appeals examiner has to responsibility of developing all the evidence reasonably
available. Appellant's Brief, p. 8. Employer argues the Commission applied a "heightened
evidentiary standard, raised for the fist time after the record is closed that was prejudicial and
unfair." Appellant's Brief, p. 8.

In a case cited by Appellant, Idaho State Insurance Fund v. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho 257,
715 P.2d 927 (I986), this Court discussed the nature of a de nova review of a hearing officer's
decision by a commission, in that case, the Personnel Commission. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho at 259,
715 P.2d at 929. In Hunnicutt, the Personnel Commission, like the Industrial Commission in this
case, engaged in a de novo review of a hearing officer's decision. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho at 259,
715 P.2d at 929. This Court found that when a commission engages in a de novo review of the
record, the decision of the Commission is not a mere reversal of a lower tribunal, rather it
becomes a new decision effectively displacing the hearing officer's decision. @. See also,
Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho448,453, 180 P.3d. 487,492 (2008); and Department of
Health and Welfare v. Sandoval, 113 Idaho 186, 189,742 P.2d 992,995 (1987). This Court also
held it was not the place of the reviewing court to determine whether the hearing officer's
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determination was reasonable in light of the record, or to weigh the decision of the hearing
officer against that of the Commission. Hunnicutt, 110 Idaho at 259,715 P.2d at 929.

In unemployment compensation cases, this Court has declined to adopt findings of fact at
variance with the Commission's findings of fact where such facts are supported by substantial
and competent evidence regardless of whether witnesses have personally appeared before the
Commission. Booth v. City of Burley, 99 Idaho 229, 233, 580 P.2d 75, 78 (1978). The
substantial and competent evidence rule requires this Court in an unemployment benefits case to
determine whether the Commission's "findings of fact are reasonable."

m,135 Idaho at 237,

16 P.3d at 913, quoting H d c u t t , 110 Idaho at 260,715 P.2d at 930.
As the ultimate fact-finder for determining unemployment benefit eligibility status, the
Commission is entitled to consider all the evidence and issues presented to the appeals examiner.
Scrivner, 126 Idaho at 959, 895 P.2d at 560. This Court has held that the Commission's
conclusions regarding the credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless the
conclusions are clearly erroneous. Oxley v. Medicine Rock Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476,
479,80 P.3d 1077, 1080 (2003).

In its Decision and Order, the Commission concluded Employer discharged Claimant, but
not for misconduct in connection with employment. Appendix A, p. 23. Idaho's Employment
Security Law provides that "an employee who has been discharged on grounds of work-related
misconduct is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits." Roll v. City of Middleton,
105 Idaho 22,25,665 P.2d 721, 724 (1983); Idaho Code § 72-1366(5) (2006). The focus is not
on whether Employer had reasonable grounds for discharging Claimant, but rather whether the
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reasons for the discharge constituted misconduct in connection with his employment. Beatv v.
City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891, 892, 719 P.2d 1151, 1152 (1986). This Corut has defined
misconduct in connection with employment in three ways. To establish misconduct, Employer
must show Claimant's conduct was a willful, intentional disregard of its interests; a deliberate
violation of its rules; or a disregard of the standards of behavior it had a right to expect of its
employees.

m,141 Idaho at 3, 105 P.3d at 269.

In its Decision and Order, the Commission found Employer discharged Claimant for
insubordination for submitting an affidavit without prior approval of the Director. Appendix A,
p. 17. The record supports the Commission's finding of fact. Employer did not offer a copy of
the notice of pending disciplinary action it gave to Claimant on October 14, 2008. Rather, Mr.
Clark testified that he discharged Claimant because Claimant signed an affidavit which contained
interpretations of county building code provisions related to a specific project. Claimant also
made statements regarding what the director knew or didn't know in the affidavit without review
or authorization from the director. Tr. p. 6, L1. 10-14. Employer did not offer any evidence
beyond this statement concerning the statements in the affidavit Employer found objectionable.
However, later in the hearing, Mr. Clark testified that Claimant was terminated for
insubordination for providing interpretations in the affidavit without consulting the director. TI.
p. 13, L1. 1-15.
The Commission concluded that Claimant's conduct did not deliberately violate
Employer's rules. The Commission found there was "no evidence of a specific policy stating
affidavits must be approved by the director." Appendix A, p. 19. The record supports the
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Commission's finding. Claimant testified there was "no policy written or verbally communicated
regarding the signing of affidavits." Tr. p. 20, L1. 11-12. Employer offered no evidence that it
had a policy regarding affidavits.
Under the circumstances, the Commission concluded Claimant's conduct would be better
assessed under a standards of behavior analysis. Appendix A, p. 19. The record and legal
precedent support the Commission's analysis. This Court has defined insubordination in the
context of unemployment insurance proceedings. Insubordination is defined as the deliberate or
willful refusal by an employee to obey a reasonable order or directive, which an employer is
authorized to give, and is entitled to have obeyed. Avery v. B. B. Rental Toilets, 97 Idaho 61 1,
614, 549 P.2d 270, 273 (1976). In Folks v. Moscow School District #281, 129 Idaho 833, 933
P.2d 642 (1997), this Court discussed where insubordination fits within the three categories of

misconduct. Such behavior, this Conrt concluded, "is merely one way by which an employer can
prove misconduct as a disregard of the standards of behavior which the employer has a right to
expect."

m,129 Idaho at 837,933 P.2d at 646.

This Court employs a two parttest in a standards of behavior inquiry by asking first,
whether the employees conduct fell below a standard of behavior the employer had a right to
expect and second, whether the employer's expectations were objectively reasonable under the
circumstances. @. Unlike the test for a willful, intentional disregard of its interests or the test for
a deliberate violation of its rules, the claimant's subjective state of mind is irrelevant. There is no
requirement that the claimant's conduct be willful, intentional, or deliberate.
4, 105 P.3d at 270.
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m,141 Idaho at

Under the standards of behavior test for misconduct Employer's expectations must be
objectively reasonable. An "employer's expectations are ordinarily reasonable only where they
have been communicated to the employee."

m,129 Idaho at 838, P.2d at 647. Employer must

show by a preponderance of the evidence that it communicated its expectations lo Claimant, or
that its expectations "flow normally" from the employment relationship.

a. "A preponderance

of the evidence means that when weighing all of the evidence in the record, the evidence on
which the finder of fact relies is more probably true than not." Oxley, 139 Idaho at 476, 80 P.3d
at 1082.
The Commission concluded Employer's expectations were not adequately communicated
to Claimant. Appendix A, p. 21. At the hearing, Mr. Clark and Claimant both testified that
Claimant received a corrective action in March2007 from Employer's interim director, however,
there was no evidence in the record that this corrective action addressed affidavits. The
Commission found that there was no evidence in the record that Claimant was aware "that he
needed prior approval for affidavits regarding interpretations." Appendix A, p. 21. Claimant
testified that there was no policy written or verbally communicated to him regarding the signing
of affidavits. Tr. p. 20, L1. 11-12. Claimant's testimony that in 2006 and June of 2008 he signed
affidavits without prior approval and without objection from Employer was not disputed. Tr. p.
22, L1. 10-25; p. 23, L1. 1-3.

In its Brief, Employer argues that the Commission failed to recognize that Claimant
acknowledged that Employer required him to seek prior authorization when he was making
certain interpretations of county building code provisions. Appellant's Brief p. 7. Claimant
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testified he was required to seek authorization when he made interpretations of county building
code provisions that were questionable. Tr. p. 17, L1. 21-25.
The Commission found Mr. Clark's testimony concerning the expectations communicated
to Claimant in the March 2007 corrective action was hearsay and found it less credible.
Appendix A, p.21. Mr. Clark was not present when Claimant received the corrective action
document and had no personal knowledge as to whether Claimant actually received this warning.
The Commission determines the credit and weight to be given to the testimony admitted.
Bullard, 128 Idaho at 432,914 P.2d at 566. The Commission is given latitude to exclude hearsay
evidence. Himins v. Larry Miller Subm, 145 Idaho 1, 5, 175 P.3d 163, 167 (2007). The
Commission can disregard hearsay evidence. Wulff v. Sun Vallev Co., 127 Idaho 71, 77, 896
P.2d 979, 984 (1995). As a fact-finding administrative agency, the Commission cannot make a
finding of fact based on hearsay.

Citizen's Utilities Companv v. Shoshone Natural Gas

Company, 82 Idaho 208,214,351 P.2d 487,490 (1960).
However, even if the Commission found Mr. Clark's testimony credible, the only
instruction given to Claimant was to "[rleview interpretations and policy decision with the
director and legal counsel before implementation." Tr. p. 7. Ll. 11-12. Claimant testified that he
did not interpret an ordinance in the affidavit he signed on August 28, 2008. Rather, he merely
provided "the historical interpretation of the structure setbacks on this particular piece of
property." Tr. p. 18, Ll. 11-18. There is no evidence in the record to suggest Claimant shouId
have known that providing a historical interpretation of structure setbacks violated Employer's
policy.
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Mr. Clark testified that Claimant did interpret an ordinance in the affidavit, but offered
nothing from the actual affidavit to support that conclusion.

Tr. p. 11, Ll. 9-13.

The

Commission concluded that Mr. Clark's testimony alone could not meet Employer's burden of
proof.

The Commission concluded that without the affidavit and the corrective action

documentation, it could not determine whether Claimant made something other than a historical
interpretation. Without the affidavit, the Commission found it could not determine whether
Claimant's conduct adversely affected Employer's interest. Appendix A, p.22.
The Commission properly conducted a de novo review of the record. Each finding of fact
and conclusion of law is supported by substantial and competent evidence. Acting as ultimate
fact-finder, the Commission weighed the evidence and rejected hearsay evidence relied on by the
appeals examiner. This does not in and of itself render the record insufficient, requiring
additional evidence. The Commission is not required to consider additional evidence and the
decision to consider additional evidence is discretionary. Idaho Code 872-1368(7) (2006).
Exercising its discretion the Commission concluded the interests of justice did not require a new
hearing. Appendix B, p. 26. The burden of proving misconduct by a preponderance of the
evidence is on the Employer.

m,141 Idaho at 3, 105 P.3d at 269.

Employer's reliance on

hearsay to meet its burden of proof was unfortunate, but the failure to offer evidence ultimately
found reliable by the fact-finder does not offend the interests of justice. The Commission noted
that the record lacked "key pieces of evidence" to support Employer's contentions. Appendix A,
p. 7. It was evidence Employer had available to it that it simply chose not to present.

CONCLUSION
Because the record contains substantial and competent evidence to support the
Commission's conclusion that Employer discharged Claimant, but not for misconduct in
connection with his employment, making Claimant eligible for benefits pursuant to Idaho Code

$72-1366(5),the Department asks this Court to affirm the Commission's Decision.
Respectfully submitted,

Deputy ~ttorne&idmal
Idaho Department of Labor
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Claimant, Mark W. Mussman, appeals a Decision issued by the Idaho Department of
Labor ("IDOL") finding that Claimant is ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. The
Appeals Examiner ruled that Employer discharged Claimant for misconduct related to the
employment. After filing his appeal, Claimant submitted a brief which included additional
documents that were not originally entered into the record. We constnted this as a request for a
hearing. In a May 6, 2009 Order, we denied Claimant's request for a new hearing to offer the
additional evidence, but granted a briefing schedule. Claimant timely submitted a revised brief.
Employer submitted a timely reply brief.
In kis revised brief, Claimant wanted clarification if any of the additional documents he
supplied would be considered by the Commission in this decision. The only evidence being
considered by the Commission in this claim are those documents marked as exhibits and
admitted into the record by the Appeals Examiner at the hearing. None of the proposed exhibits
included with Claimant's brief will be considered in this decision. We direct Claimant back to

our May 6,2009, Order which explains why they are not considered.
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The undersigned Commissioners have conducted a de novo review of the record in
accordance with Idaho Code § 72-1368(7) and Idaho Supreme Court opinions. The Commission
has relied on the audio recording of the hearing the Appeals Examiner held on March 10, .2009,
along with the exhibits [l through 41 admitted into the evidentiary record during that proceeding.

''FINDINGSOF FACT
Based on the testimony and the evidence in the record, the Commission sets forth its own
Findings of Fact as follows.
1.

Claimant was employed by Employer from August 27, 2001, :until
October 14,2008. He worked as a planner 111 since ~ecember,2005.

2.

In March, 2007, Claimant received a corrective action plan &om the
interim Director.

3.

In 2007 and early 2008, Claimant signed affidavits without the
Director's approval.

4.

On August 8, 2008, the Director, Joseph Scott Clark, sent an email to
Claimant which provided Mr. Clark's interpretation of County code to
a specific project. On August 11, 2008, Claimant, Mr. Clark, and
others met to discuss the project. Claimant did not agree with Mr.
Clark's interpretation but the group had a productive meeting.

5.

On August 28, 2008, Claimant provided an affidavit interpreting the
County code and the project at &e request of a property representative.
Claimant did not have the affidavit reviewed by Mr. Clark or the legal
department. Mr. Clark felt the &davit was in direct contradiction
with his interpretation and reflected negatively on the County.
Claimant was subsequently discharged on October 14, 2008, for
signing an affidavit without the approval of the Director.

DISCUSSION
The Idaho Employment Security Law provides unemployment insurance benefits to
claimants who become unemployed due to no failure of their own. In the case of a discharge, as
was the cause for the separation here, the issue is whether the claimant committed some form of
employment-related misconduct that would render him or her ineligible for unemployment
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employment-related misconduct that would render him or her ineligible for unemployment
benefits pursuant to Idaho Code

5

1366(5).

The burden of proving misconduct by a

preponderance of the evidence falls strictly on the employer. Appeals Examiner of Idaho Dept.
of Labor v. J.R. Simplot Co., 131 Idaho 318, 320, 955 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1998).

If the

discharging employer does not meet that burden, benefits must be awarded to the claimant.
v. City of Middleton, 105 Idaho 22,25, 665 P.2d 721,724 (1983); Parker v. St. Maries Plvwood,
101 Idaho 415,419,614 P.2d 955,959 (1980).
What constitutes "just cause" in the mind of an employer for dismissing an employee is
not the legal equivalent of "misconduct" under Idaho's Employment Security Law. The two
issues are separate and distinct. Therefore, whether the employer had reasonable grounds
according to the employer's standards for dismissing a claimant is not controlling of the outcome
in these cases. Our only concern is whether the reasons for discharge constituted "misconduct"
connected with the claimant's employment such that the claimant can be denied unemployment
benefits. Beaty v. City of Idaho Falls, 110 Idaho 891,892,719 P.2d 1151,1152 (1986).
The Idaho Supreme Court has defied misconduct as a willful, intentional disregard of
the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or a disregard of standards
of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of its employees. Gunter v. Magic Valley
Regional Medical Center, 143 Idaho 63, 137 P.3d 450 (2006) (citing Johns v. S. H. Kress &
Company, 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 217, 219 (1957)). In addition, the Court requires the
Commission to consider all three grounds in determining whether misconduct exists. Dietz v.
Minidoka County Highway Dist., 127 Idaho 246,248,899 P.2d 956,958 (1995).
Employer contends that Claimant was discharged because Claimant signed an affidavit
without authorization of the Director. (Audio Recording). Employer alleges that this constituted
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insubordination and that it adversely affected the County. (Audio Recording). In addition,
Employer argues that according to its policies, insubordination or conduct that reflects adversely
on the County is grounds for termination. There is no evidence of a specific policy stating that
affidavits must be approved by the Director. Therefore, because the alleged policy violation is
based on Claimant's conduct, we find that assessing whether the conduct was insubordinate or
reflected negatively on the County can be better assessed under the analysis of the standards-ofbehavior and a willful, intentional disregard of Employer's interest.
Under the "standards-of-behavior" analysis, the employer must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that it communicated its expectations to the claimant, or that its expectations
"flowed normally" from the employment relationship. Further, the employer must demonstrate
that those expectations were objectively reasonable as applied to the claimant. As the Idaho
Supreme Court has pointed out, an "employer's expectations are ordinarily reasonable only
where they have been communicated to the employee." Folks v. Moscow School District No.
281, 129 Idaho 833,838,933 P.2d 642,647 (1997).
Here, Employer contends that Claimant's actions of submitting an affidavit interpreting
code on a specific project without prior approval of the Director was insubordinate. Employer
alleges that Claimant was previously warned by the interim director in a March, 2007, corrective
action plan that any interpretation must be approved by the Director and the legal department.
(Audio Recording).

According to the Idaho Supreme Court, insubordimation connotes a

deliberate or willful refusal by an employee to obey a reasonable order or directive that an
employer is authorized to give and entitled to have obeyed. Averv v. B.B. Rental Toilets, 97
Idaho 61 1, 614, 549 P.2d 270,273 (1976). Employer argues that it had a reasonable expectation
that Claimant would follow the interim Director's alleged mandate that Claimant have all
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interpretations reviewed by the Director and the legal department.
Wbile employers usually have a reasonable expectation that its employees will perform
their job duties as directed, the key issue here is whether or not this expectation was adequately
co~lununicatedto Claimant. What communication did or did not take place between the
employer and the claimant becomes a key element in these cases. An employee can only be held
accountable for breaching those expectations that he or she understood, explicitly or implicitly,
and was capable of satisfying. Puckett v. Idaho Department of Corrections, 107 Idaho 1022, 695
P.2d 407 (1985).
In this case, Employer did not submit into the record a copy of the affidavit or the
corrective action plan. Instead, it relied solely on the testimony of its Director, Mr. Clark. Mr.
Clark read into the record that the corrective action plan required Claimant to have all
interpretations reviewed by the Director and the legal department.

(Audio Recording).

However, Claimant testified that he was never told, either in writing or verbally, that he needed
prior approval by the Director or the legal department. (Audio Recording). Because both parties
provided equally credible evidence, we cannot find that Employer's testimony is more
persuasive that of Claimant.
Not only do the parties testimony conflict, but we are without the best evidence of the
conective action. Without a copy of the conective action plan, we cannot determine what was
truly written on the form. While a technical rule and not generally applicable to administrative
hearings, we find that reference to the best evidence rule is particularly relevant here. DiLucent
Corn. v. Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Board, 692 A.2d 295, 298 (1997). The rule states, in
general, that "to prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing,
recording, or photograph is required." ID R. Evid. Rule 1002. In this case, we assume that a

DECISION AND ORDER - 5

20

hard copy of the corrective action plan was available to submit into the record since Employer
read its alleged contents into the record. We also note that the corrective action plan was written
by the interim director, not Mr. Clark. Since the interim director did not testify, the evidence
read into the record is considered hearsay. Therefore, based on the above reasons, the corrective
plan read into the record carries little weight.
There is also evidence that Claimant continued to write interpretations after the corrective
action plan without prior approval from the director with no consequence. Claimant stated that
he had previously written two affidavits without director approval. (Audio Recording). While it
is unclear whether both came after his corrective action plan, at least one dated late 2008 came
after the corrective action. There is no indication that Claimant received discipline about failing
to obtain prior approval.
As a result, we cannot determine by a preponderance of the evidence that Claimant was
aware that he needed prior approval for affidavits regarding interpretations.

Absent the

corrective action plan document, we cannot conclude that the corrective action plan warned
Claimant that he needed prior approval from the Director and Claimant contends that he received
no such instruction. Furthermore, Claimant wrote at least one affidavit after the corrective action
plan that was not subject to the Director's review. There is no evidence in the record that
Claimant received discipline for this aftidavit. Therefore, we cannot find that Employer's
expectation was adequately communicated to Claimant or, subsequently, that Claimant's
behavior fell below that standard.
Employer also contends that Claimant's behavior constituted a willful, intentional
disregard of Employer's interest. In support of this conclusion, Mr. Clark stated that he sent
Claimant an email on August 8, 2008, with Mr. Clark's interpretation of the project. (Audio
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Recording).

Mr. Clark testified that his interpretation was in direct conflict with the

interpretation that Claimant sent. (Audio Recording). Therefore, since Claimant was aware of
the Director's interpretation, Mr. Clark believes that Claimant willfully and intentionally sent out
a conflicting interpretation that disregarded Employer's interest. (Audio Recording).
Claimant argues that the interpretation was a historical interpretation.

(Audio

Recording). He testified that he, the Director, and other employees met to discuss Mr. Clark's
interpretation. (Audio Recording).. Claimant maintains that the meeting was productive
regarding the interpretation and that at the conclusion of the meeting, Claimant understood the
final decision was up to the Director. (Audio Recording). The interpretation Claimant provided
was not a new interpretation, but provided the developer with the historical view.
While Claimant's actions are of some concern, there is insufficient evidence to find by a
preponderance of the evidence that Claimant's affidavit constituted a disregard of Employer's
interest. Claimant maintains that the interpretation was historical, that he did not make a new
interpretation, and that he understood that the fmal decision was up to the Director. Without the
affidavit, we cannot definitively decipher if it adversely affected Employer's interest.
As one court stated, "Unemployment compensation is not a gratuity which may be
withheld frivolously." Wyoming Department of Emvloyment v. Rissler & McMuny Company,
837 P.2d 686, 690 (1992). Therefore, it bears repeating that when an employer discharges an
employee, that employer must meet its burden of demonstrating that the claimant committed
misconduct as described in the Idaho Employment Security Law. Employer has not met that
burden. The record lacks the key pieces of evidence to support Employer's contentions. They
may very well be accurate, but without copies of the corrective action, we cannot determine
whether the need for Director's approval was adequately communicated to Claimant.
...
Additionally, without the affidavit, we cannot decipher the context of the information provided
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or assess whether it harmed Employer. As a result, we cannot find that Claimant's conduct was
a willful, intentional disregard of Employer's interest. Furthermore, the record also does not
contain a copy of Employer's policies or rules. While Employer read into the record a policy
stating that insubordination or conduct that reflects negatively on the County can result in
termination, as just mentioned, there is insufficient evidence to find insubordination or conduct
that reflected negatively on the County. Therefore, we cannot find by a preponderance of the
evidence that Claimant was discharged for misconduct. Claimant is eligible for benefits.
As a side note, Claimant alleges that Employer's counsel has a conflict of interest
because counsel represented Claimant.

(Claimant's revised brief).

Employer's counsel

responded that he represented Claimant only as a county employee in the regular course of his
duties as counsel to the County.

(Employer's brief).

While this Decision likely makes

Claimant's argument of little consequence, there is no evidence that for this claim, Claimant's
due process rights were violated or otherwise thwarted fiom any alleged conflict of interest.

CONCLUSION OF LAW
Claimant was discharged, but not for misconduct in connection with the employment.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Decision of the Appeals Examiner is REVERSED.
Claimant is eligible for unemployment insurance benefits. This is a final order under Idaho Code

3 72-1368(7).
DATED this &day

of

,
.

,2009.

I N D U S T U L COMMISSION
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Claimant, Mark. W. Mussman, appeals to the industrial Commission a Decision issued
by the Idaho Department of Labor ("IDOL" or "Department") ruling him ineligible for
unemployment benefits.

In that Decision, the Department's Appeals Examiner concluded

Employer discharged Claimant for misconduct. In addition to his appeal to the Commission,
Claimant asks for a new hearing before the Commission. Claimant also submitted, separately, a
document entitled "Claimant's Brief" with additional documents attached as exhibits that are not
part of the record established by the Appeals Examiner. (Claimant's brief, filed April 30,2009).
We address both of these requests more fully below.

NEW HEARING
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-1368(7), the Commission may, in its sole discretion,
"conduct a hearing to receive additional evidence or may remand the matter back to the appeals
examiner for an additional hearing and decision."

In this case, Claimant asks that the

Commission consider additional documents that are not part of the evidentiary record established
during the Appeals Examiner's hearing.

Before we could evaluate the contents. of these
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documents Claimant provided as exhibits to his brief, we would have to re-open the evidentiary
record and admit them.
Rule 7(B) 5 of the Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure, under the Idaho
Employment Security Law, effective as amended, March 1,2009, provides that a party requesting
a hearing to offer additional evidence shall submit "the reasons why the proposed evidence was
not presented before the appeals examiner."

Whether a party seeks to present additional

evidence or make an oral argument on the basis of the record as it stands, that party must present
some justification for that request. Unemployment insurance appeals are adjudicated under the
principles and procedures of administrative law. Hearings at this level of review are not a matter
of right, as in some other forums.
Claimant participated in the Appeals Examiner's hearing on Employer's protest of the
initial Eligibility Determination and was provided an opporhmity to explain the circumstances
surrounding his separation fkom his job with Kootenai County. The Appeals Bureau informed
Claimant that if he had additional evidence that was not presented during the Appeals
Examiner's hearing, he could ask that the Appeals Examiner re-open the hearing. (Exhibit 2,
p.2). There is nothing in the record or Claimant's appeal to suggest that he attempted to exercise
that option.
The Commission takes the position that conducting a new hearing at this level of review
is an extraordinary measure and should be reserved for those cases when due process or other
interests of justice demand no less. We find no such circumstances here. By appealing his case
to the Commission, Claimant is assured that the Commission will review the evidence and draw
its own conclusions as part of its de novo review. Accordingly, Claimant's request for a new
hearing is DENIED and we will consider only that evidence in the record established during the
Appeals Examiner's hearing.
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BRIEFING SCHEDULE
Although Claimant did not file a formal request that the Commission provide him with an
opportunity to argue his case in writing, Claimant has submitted a brief. In light of our denial of
Claimant's request that we consider any additional evidence or hold an additional hearing, we
will give Claimant an opportunity to revise the brief he submitted and opposing parties an
opportunity to respond.
The Commission establishes the following briefing schedule:
Claimant may stand on the brief he has already filed or submit a revised brief. Should
Claimant desire to file a revised brief, it will be due ten (10) days from the date of this Order.
Should Employer andfor Idaho Department of Labor wish to reply, they may do so within
seven (7) days of the receipt of Claimant's revised brief. In the event that Claimant does not file
an additional brief, replies will be due seventeen (1 7) days from the date of this Order.
DATED this

&day of

U

2009.

I N D u ~ ~ r c o ~ z ~
Cheri J. Ruc ,Refer e
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